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Abstract
Identifying highly susceptible individuals in spreading processes is of great
significance in controlling outbreaks. In this paper, we explore the suscepti-
bility of people in susceptible-infectious-recovered (SIR) and rumor spreading
dynamics. We first study the impact of community structure on people’s sus-
ceptibility. Despite that the community structure can reduce the infected
population given same infection rates, it will not deterministically affect
nodes’ susceptibility. We find the susceptibility of individuals is sensitive
to the choice of spreading dynamics. For SIR spreading, since the suscepti-
bility is highly correlated to nodes’ influence, the topological indicator k-shell
can better identify highly susceptible individuals, outperforming degree, be-
tweenness centrality and PageRank. In contrast, in rumor spreading model,
where nodes’ susceptibility and influence have no clear correlation, degree
performs the best among considered topological measures. Our finding high-
lights the significance of both topological features and spreading mechanisms
in identifying highly susceptible population.
Keywords:
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1. Introduction
Developing efficient methods to prevent epidemic outbreaks or acceler-
ate information dissemination is the ultimate goal of research on spread-
ing dynamics across various domains [1–15]. For diseases and information
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that spread through social networks, the structure of underlying contact net-
work can greatly affect the spreading processes [13–15]. Previous studies
have inspected the role of topology in epidemic threshold and critical be-
havior. For example, in uncorrelated networks, the epidemic threshold is
λ = 〈k〉/(〈k2〉 − 〈k〉), where 〈k〉 and 〈k2〉 are the first and second moments
of the degree distribution [14]. Later on, in view of the wide occurrence of
intrinsic heterogeneous complex networks in real world, researchers started
to investigate the effect of microstructure on spreading dynamics in more
detailed perspectives: the community structure appearing in social networks
[16], k-shell decomposition of networks for identification of influential spread-
ers [3], link salience skeleton correlated with the frequency of a link’s appear-
ance in infection hierarchies [17], as well as weak ties which is significant for
information dissemination [18].
Due to the existence of complex microstructure, individuals with different
topological features should play distinct roles during the spreading processes.
Previous studies mainly focus on the spreading ability of individuals. Many
topological measures are employed to identify influential spreaders in net-
works, such as degree [4, 13], betweenness [19], k-shell index [3, 20], PageR-
ank [21, 22], etc. In fact, individuals situated in different positions of the
contact network will also vary in susceptibility to epidemics. Identifying the
highly susceptible individuals in contact networks is of great significance in
controlling epidemic outbreaks. Therefore, it is indispensable to explore the
factors that affect people’s susceptibility.
In this paper, we study the susceptibility of individuals in SIR and rumor
spreading dynamics through extensive simulations in real-world social net-
works. First, we explore the impact of community structure on people’s sus-
ceptibility. Even though the community structure can diminish the infected
population and slow down the spreading processes, it is not the pivotal factor
affecting nodes’ susceptibility. Although the location of epidemic source has
an impact on the precise infected probability of each single person, there exist
a group of nodes that can always get infected with relatively high probabili-
ties no matter where the spreading originates. We are particularly interested
in these populations and consider them as highly susceptible individuals. To
quantitatively depict the property of these people, we define the susceptibil-
ity of each individual as the average probability to be infected by a randomly
chosen spreading source. Then we further explore the topological properties
of the highly susceptibility individuals. By examining their topological traits
including degree, k-shell, betweenness centrality and PageRank, we find the
2
Table 1: Statistics of social networks. We display the node number N , link number L, and
average degree 〈k〉 for Facebook and Enron social networks. The critical infection rate of
SIR model βc is calculated by 〈k〉/(〈k
2〉 − 〈k〉). βS and βR are adopted infection rates in
SIR and rumor spreading simulations respectively.
Network
Topological statistics
βc βS βRN L 〈k〉
Facebook 4, 039 88, 234 43.7 0.0095 0.03 0.3
Enron 36, 692 367, 662 20.0 0.0072 0.02 0.3
susceptibility of individuals is sensitive to the choice of spreading dynamics.
For SIR spreading, the susceptibility is highly correlated to nodes’ influence.
Therefore, nodes located in the core region of networks are more likely to
be infected. However, in rumor spreading model, degree can better iden-
tify highly susceptible individuals. Our results indicate that it is necessary
to acquire the information of spreading mechanism to better locate highly
susceptible population in practice.
2. Impact of community structure on spreading processes
Most of social networks in reality have notable community structure. We
first explore the impact of community structure on individuals’ probabilities
to be infected in spreading processes. We examine the epidemic flows in
two social networks with community structure: (1) the friendship network
between users of the social network Facebook (Facebook) [23], (2) the Enron
email communication network (Enron), in which nodes are email addresses
and edges represent email communications [24]. These social networks have
been used in previous studies. Topological statistics of networks are shown
in Table 1. In our following study, we treat all these networks as undirected.
The community structure is extracted by a fast heuristic method based on
modularity optimization [25]. The layout of community structure for Face-
book social network is shown with different colors in Fig. 1(a). To simulate
spreading processes among populations, we first apply susceptible-infectious-
recovered (SIR) [26, 27] model on the above social networks. In SIR model,
the population can be classified into three possible states: susceptible (S),
infected (I), or recovered (R). Starting from a single epidemic source node,
3
Fig. 1: SIR epidemic spreading in Facebook social network. The infection rate is set as
βS = 0.03. (a), The layout of community structure for Facebook social network. Eight
communities are distinguished by different colors. (b, c, d), Distributions of infected
probability for spreading sources in different communities. The solid black dots represent
outbreak origins. The infected probability is obtained by averaging over 105 SIR real-
izations. The colors indicate the logarithmic values (base 10) of infected probability for
corresponding individuals.
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at each time step, the infected individuals (I) would infect their susceptible
neighbors (S) with probability βS and then become recovered (R) and gain
permanent immunity with probability λ. Such process continues until there
are no infected individuals in the system. In our simulations, without loss
of generality, we set λ = 1. Previous studies have adopted this model to de-
scribe diffusion of contagious diseases. For information dissemination, recent
works have shown that, although some information spreading processes are
greatly affected by human-related factors [28–32], a few information memes
showing viral behavior can also spread like infectious diseases [33]. Hence the
SIR model is applicable not only to epidemics but also to those information
memes which are not seriously affected by human-related factors.
In simulations, the selection of infection rate βS could significantly affect
the spreading outcomes. Below the critical value βc = 〈k〉/(〈k
2〉 − 〈k〉), the
proportion of infected individuals will vanish in the limit of a very large
population. For βS much larger than βc, the epidemic will infect almost all
the people in the network. In our study, we use relatively small values of
βS to guarantee medium scale infection coverage. Otherwise most of the
nodes will be infected with high probabilities, making their susceptibility
indistinguishable. In Table 1, we report the critical infection rate βc and
adopted value βS in our simulations. The infection rate βS is slightly above
its corresponding critical value βc to generate moderate coverage.
For Facebook network, we select three nodes in different communities as
spreading sources and apply 105 realizations of SIR model. The infected
probability of each individual is approximated by the frequency of getting
infected in these realizations. In Fig.1(b-d), we display the distribution of
infected probability for Facebook social network. The black dots represent
outbreak origins and the infected probability is indicated by colors. Clearly,
the epidemic permeates to several communities. Moreover, during all the
epidemic spreading, there exist a group of individuals retaining relatively
high infected probabilities, regardless of the positions of spreading sources.
In order to check the effect of community structure on spreading pro-
cesses, we compare the evolution of infected proportion ρ in networks with
and without community structure. For Facebook network, we rewire the
links to destroy the community structure. Specifically, we randomly select
two links (A,B) and (C,D), and then swap the end nodes to (A,D) and
(B,C). This procedure breaks down the communities but preserves the de-
gree distribution. In our simulations, we perform 106 rewire operations. The
result of SIR model is shown in Fig.2(a). Under same conditions, the rewired
5
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Fig. 2: Community structure will reduce the infected population and slow down the spread-
ing processes. For Facebook and rewired Facebook social networks, we perform SIR model
with βS = 0.03. The evolution of infected proportion ρ is displayed in (a). In (b), we
present the infected proportion ρ versus time t for rumor spreading model with βR = 0.3.
Facebook network has a much higher infected proportion, which implies the
community structure restricts the spreading processes to some extent. Mean-
while, it will take a longer time for Facebook network with community struc-
ture to achieve a given infected proportion ρ. Therefore, the community
structure will slow down the speed of SIR spreading.
To examine whether our finding is applicable to other spreading dynam-
ics, we perform the same analysis on rumor spreading model [8]. In rumor
spreading model, each individual can be in three possible states: the spreader
(S), ignorant (I), and stifler (R). Spreaders represent nodes that are aware of
the rumor and are willing to transmit it. Ignorant people are individuals un-
aware of the rumor. Stiflers stand for those that already know the rumor but
are not willing to spread it anymore. In each time step, the spreaders contact
one of their neighbors randomly and turn the ignorant ones into spreaders
with probability βR. If the spreaders encounter spreaders or stiflers, they will
turn to stiflers with probability λ. We also set λ = 1 in our simulations. We
obtain similar results in Fig.2(b).
3. Susceptibility of individuals in spreading processes
During spreading processes, the exact values of infected probability de-
pends on the choice of spreading sources. But in real-world applications,
usually we have no information about the locations of spreading origins,
which makes it impractical and intractable to obtain individuals’ exact in-
fected probability during an epidemic outbreak. In spite of that, there exist
6
a group of nodes exhibiting relatively high infected probability regardless of
the position of source (see Fig.1(b-d)). In our work, we will focus on these
persons who would be infected easily from a randomly chosen spreading ori-
gin. We define the source-independent susceptibility Si of a given individual i
as the average infected probability over epidemics starting from all the nodes
in the network:
Si =
1
N
N∑
j=1
∑T
k=1 pi
k
ij
T
=
1
N
N∑
j=1
pij , (1)
where N is the number of nodes in the network, and T is the number of
spreading realizations originating from each node. In our research, we set
T = 104. Besides, pikij denotes whether node i gets infected (pi
k
ij = 1) or
not (pikij = 0) during the k
th spreading realization originating from node j.
Accordingly, pij =
∑T
k=1 pi
k
ij/T represents the average infected probability of
node i during the spreading from node j. We should note that this definition
of susceptibility is different from that in [34], where the susceptibility is de-
fined as the nature of individuals, such as immune system, physical condition
or learning ability, etc. According to our definition, on average, nodes with
higher susceptibility Si are more likely to be infected during an epidemic
wherever the contagion starts.
For SIR spreading model, we can calculate the susceptibility with the
standard set of equations of SIR dynamics. For a network with N nodes, the
topology is recorded by the adjacency matrixA = {aij}N×N , where aij = 1 if
node i and j are connected, and aij = 0 otherwise. We denote the probability
of node i being in susceptible, infected and recovered state at time t as pSi (t),
pIi (t) and p
R
i (t) respectively. For networks without too many short loops, we
assume the neighbors of one node can independently get infected at time t.
Then the evolution of dynamics follows
dpSi (t)
dt
= −[1−
N∏
j=1
(1− βSaijp
I
j (t)p
S
i (t))], (2)
dpIi (t)
dt
= [1−
N∏
j=1
(1− βSaijp
I
j (t)p
S
i (t))]− p
I
i (t), (3)
dpRi (t)
dt
= pIi (t). (4)
Here aij is the element of adjacency matrix A. In case of small infection
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rate βS, the term [1 −
∏N
j=1(1 − βSaijp
I
j (t)p
S
i (t))] can be approximated by
βSp
S
i (t)
∑N
j=1 aijp
S
j (t). In fact, there are only two independent equations
since pSi (t)+p
I
i (t)+p
R
i (t) = 1. We discretize the above equations and obtain
two independent ones
pIi (t+ 1) = βS(1− p
I
i (t)− p
R
i (t))
N∑
j=1
aijp
I
j(t), (5)
pRi (t+ 1) = p
R
i (t) + p
I
i (t). (6)
For simplicity, the above equations can be transformed into a matrix
form. Denote pI(t) as the vector (pI0(t), · · · , p
I
N(t))
T , pR(t) as the vec-
tor (pR0 (t), · · · , p
R
N(t))
T , and P S(t) as the diagonal matrix diag(1 − pI0(t) −
pR0 (t), · · · , 1− p
I
N (t)− p
R
N (t)). Then we have
pI(t+ 1) = βSP
S(t)ApI(t), (7)
pR(t+ 1) = pR(t) + pI(t). (8)
Therefore, we obtain the evolution functions for pI(t) and pR(t). Since
we select the spreading source randomly, the initial condition is pI(0) =
(1/N, · · · , 1/N) and pR(0) = ((N − 1)/N, · · · , (N − 1)/N). The suscepti-
bility vector S = (S0, · · · , SN)
T = pR(∞). Here ∞ indicates the spreading
dynamic evolves for a long enough period of time so that no infected individ-
uals are left in the system. In case of sparse networks, the iteration converges
very quickly. Therefore the susceptibility can be calculated by this method
efficiently.
We verify the calculation on Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) random networks. We
construct the ER random network with size N = 104 and average degree
〈k〉 = 5 by randomly assigning 25, 000 links among 104 nodes. Then we
perform SIR simulations to obtain simulated susceptibility Si and calculate
the theoretical value Sthi through iterations. For βS = 0.1, the theoretical
values agree well with the simulation results (see Fig.3(a)). However, for
βS = 0.25, which is above the threshold value βc = 0.2, theoretical values
are considerably larger than simulation values (see Fig.3(b)). This discrep-
ancy can be explained by the invalidation of assumptions. For a relatively
large infection rate βS, the epidemic would occupy a macroscopic fraction of
population. Under this condition, the assumption that a node’s neighbors
are infected independently becomes invalid. Therefore, the exact probability
of a node i to be infected by its neighbors at time t should be smaller than
8
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Fig. 3: For ER random network (N = 104, 〈k〉 = 5), the simulation values of Si and
theoretical predictions Sth
i
are displayed in (a) (βS = 0.1) and (b) (βS = 0.25). The slope
of simulation values versus theoretical predictions for different βS is shown in (c). The
inset presents their correlation coefficient. In (d), we show the residual error of theoretical
predictions for various βS .
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βSp
S
i (t)
∑N
j=1 aijp
S
j (t), which implies our method overestimates nodes’ sus-
ceptibility. Even though the calculation has the problem of overestimation,
the theoretical predictions and simulation values follow a straight line. We
fit this line to Si = kS
th
i for different βS ∈ [0, 0.3] and examine the correla-
tion coefficient between Si and S
th
i in the inset of Fig.3(c). It can be seen
that theoretical predictions are highly correlated with simulated susceptibil-
ity. However, the slope k varies as βS increases. For βS < 0.15, the slope
k remains around 1, which means theoretical values are quite accurate. As
βS approaching to βc = 0.2, the slope k decreases dramatically. This implies
Sthi becomes larger than Si, even though they still have a linear relationship.
This phenomenon is also reflected in Fig.3(d), in which we display the resid-
ual error R =
∑
i |Si − S
th
i | for different βS. With βS increasing to βc, the
residual error R rises abruptly. Therefore, our method predicts susceptibility
accurately for infection rate βS smaller than threshold value βc, and can be
used to rank susceptibility for βS near or larger than βc.
4. Topological indicators for highly susceptible individuals
Although we have calculated the susceptibility with the standard set of
equations of spreading dynamics, it is still convenient to discern highly sus-
ceptible individuals with topological indicators in practice. Here we explore
some of the most important topological measures in network theory. The
most straightforward and simple one is degree k, i.e. the number of con-
nections a node maintains. Hubs (high degree nodes) are believed to play
significant roles in many dynamical processes. More connections may lead
to a higher chance to be infected in an epidemic spreading. However, degree
only reflects nodes’ number of neighbors. In order to check people’s global
location in networks, we also examine the k-shell index kS by k-shell decom-
position analysis [3, 35–39]. The k-shell decomposition can be described as
follows: firstly we start by recursively removing nodes with degree k = 1
until there are only nodes with degree k > 1 left in the network. All the
nodes removed in this procedure are assigned with kS = 1. In a similar
way, we iteratively find out higher k-shells until all nodes are pruned. In
this procedure, each node will be assigned a unique k-shell index kS. Nodes
belonging to high (low) k-shells are located in the core (periphery) area of
the network. Another topological measure, betweenness centrality, quantifies
the number of shortest paths passing through each node. In social science,
10
the betweenness centrality of node i, denoted by BC(i) is defined as
BC(i) =
∑
s 6=i 6=t
σst(i)
σst
, (9)
where σst is the number of shortest paths between nodes s and t, and σst(i)
is the number of shortest paths between s and t which pass through node i.
Consequently, nodes with large betweenness centrality usually hold the vital
positions in the shortest pathways between large numbers of nodes pairs. In
addition, considering the importance of nodes’ neighbors, PageRank, which
is originally introduced to rank web pages, is proposed [21]. The PageRank
of a node i in a network can be calculated from
Pt(i) =
d
N
+ (1− d)
∑
j
aijPt−1(j)
k(j)
, (10)
where aij is the element of adjacency matrix A and d is the jumping prob-
ability. In our calculation, as in many previous studies, we set d = 0.15
conventionally. To sum up, we have chosen four typical topological mea-
sures proposed from different perspectives: degree k, k-shell kS, betweenness
centrality BC and PageRank.
First, we compare the performance of k-shell and degree for SIR model.
For individuals with a given combination of k-shell and degree (kS, k), we
check the average susceptibility S(kS, k):
S(kS, k) =
∑
i∈Υ(ks,k)
Si
N(kS, k)
. (11)
Here Υ(ks, k) is the collection of all nodes with k-shell and degree (kS, k),
and N(kS, k) is the number of nodes in the set Υ(ks, k). The susceptibil-
ity Si of node i is calculated by averaging over 10
4 SIR realizations in each
social network. We display the logarithmic value (base 10) of S(kS, k) in
Fig.4(a), (d), (g) and (j) for Facebook, Enron, rewired Facebook and rewired
Enron social networks respectively. It is observed that most highly suscep-
tible individuals occupy high k-shells. For nodes with a fixed degree k, the
susceptibility can be either large or small, depending on their k-shell values.
Meanwhile, the individuals located in the same kS shell have similar suscep-
tibility. This implies, k-shell index could better reflect nodes’ susceptibility
than degree k. We also perform same analyses for betweenness centrality
11
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Fig. 4: Comparison of different topological indicators for SIR model. For Facebook (a,
b, c), Enron (d, e, f), rewired Facebook (g, h, i) and rewired Enron (j, k, l) networks,
we plot the average values of logarithmic susceptibility (base 10) for nodes with combined
k-shell kS and degree k (a, d, g), betweenness centrality BC (b, e, h) and PageRank (c, f,
i) respectively. The infection rate βS is 0.03 and 0.02 for Facebook and Enron networks.
Values are indicated by colors, which are shown in color bars.
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Fig. 5: The recognition rate r(f) for different fraction f in SIR model. For Facebook
(a), Enron (b), rewired Facebook (c) and rewired Enron (d) social networks, we display
the recognition rate curves r(f) for k-shell kS , degree k, betweenness centrality BC and
PageRank. The fraction f ranges from 0.05 to 0.5. The infection rate βS in SIR simulations
is 0.03 and 0.02 for Facebook and Enron networks.
BC (see Fig.4(b),(e),(h),(k)) and PageRank (see Fig.4(c),(f),(i),(l)). Consis-
tently, k-shell index kS outperforms betweenness centrality and PageRank in
predicting the average susceptibility of individuals.
We should also note that our results are not affected by the community
structure. We compare our results in the original and rewired networks in
Fig.4. The conclusion is not sensitive to the existence of community struc-
ture. No matter where the node locates in the network (between communities
or within communities), it is susceptible to SIR spreading processes as long
as it has a high k-shell index.
Although k-shell can better predict the average susceptibility of individ-
uals, since the susceptibility for nodes with same topological measures has
fluctuations, it is still desirable to explore their accuracy in locating highly
susceptible persons. To this end, we use the recognition rate r(f) to quan-
tify the efficiency in identifying individuals of high susceptibility [38]. The
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recognition rate r(f) is defined as
r(f) =
|Sf
⋂
Mf |
|Sf |
, (12)
where Sf and Mf are the sets of nodes ranking in top f percentage by sus-
ceptibility and topological measures, and | · | is the number of elements in the
set. In fact, recognition rate r(f) indicates the proportion of highly suscepti-
ble individuals which can be predicted by each measure. The higher r(f) is,
the more accurate the predictor is. In Fig.5, we display the recognition rate
r(f) (f ∈ [0.05, 0.5]) for Facebook, Enron, rewired Facebook and rewired
Enron networks. In most cases, k-shell index kS and degree k outperform
betweenness centrality BC and PageRank. And kS performs better than
degree k in general, except when the fraction f is relatively small for Face-
book and rewired Facebook networks. This can be explained by the fact that
in these networks, nodes with extremely large degree tend to locate in the
core region. Therefore, if we pick high-degree nodes, they will also have high
kS. However, the number of such hubs is not too large. As we increase the
fraction f , kS could still identify more highly susceptible individuals. This
phenomenon depends on the exact topological structure of networks. For
instance, for tree-like networks, kS only contains a few values. Under this
condition, degree k can clearly better distinguish highly susceptible individ-
uals. Whereas, such simple topological structure usually does not appear
in large scale real-world social networks. On the contrary, realistic social
networks posses rather complex structure, in which hubs are not necessarily
located in the dense core. So in real scenario, kS is still an effective predictor
for highly susceptible individuals.
As pointed out in the supporting information of Ref.[3], for SIR model,
nodes’ influence and infected probability are highly correlated. We present
the relationship between susceptibility S and influence M of SIR model in
Fig.6(a). InfluenceMi is defined as the average size of the population infected
in a spreading process originating at node i. Since k-shell outperforms other
topological measures in identifying influential spreaders for SIR model [3, 38],
it should be also effective in locating highly susceptible individuals. This
explains the efficacy of k-shell for SIR model. In fact, for any independent-
interaction spreading models in which susceptibility and influence are closely
correlated, such as SIR and SIS model, k-shell should be a good topological
indicator for highly susceptible people.
14
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
influence M
Su
sc
ep
tib
ili
ty
 S
Rumor
 
 
facebook β=0.3
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Influence M
Su
sc
ep
tib
ili
ty
 S
SIR
 
 
facebook β=0.03
? ?
Fig. 6: The relationship between susceptibility S and influenceM of SIR model is presented
in (a). The infection rate βS is set to be 0.03. We also display susceptibility S versus
influence M of rumor spreading model in (b). βR is set to be 0.3.
However, for rumor spreading model, we find the susceptibility and in-
fluence have no clear correlation, as shown in Fig.6(b). In rumor spreading
model, influential spreaders are not necessarily highly susceptible to spread-
ing processes. It has been found that k-shell cannot represent nodes’ spread-
ing capability in rumor spreading model [9]. Then it is desirable to find the
topological indicator of susceptibility in rumor spreading model. Since the
figure like Fig.4 cannot distinguish the performance of some measures clearly,
we directly display the recognition rate for each topological indicator in Fig.7.
For all considered networks, degree is capable of recognizing more high-risk
people, which differs from the better performance of k-shell for SIR model.
Also, the community structure will not affect the prominent performance of
degree. Whereas, after rewiring links, the recognition rates for all indicators
are enhanced. This implies the existence of community structure undermines
the effectiveness of topological indicators.
In fact, the different results obtained in SIR model and rumor spreading
model can be explained by the spreading mechanisms. In SIR model, the
superior performance of k-shell relies on the cascading behavior of spreading
processes. Starting from the source, the epidemic will diffuse from person
to person contagiously and may eventually spread through the majority of
population in a “viral” way. Usually, a spreading process will last for many
generations before it dies out. For nodes located in the core region, not
only their neighbors are prone to be infected, but also their neighbors of
neighbors have large chances to be infected, and so forth. Consequently, k-
shell can better describe nodes’ susceptibility in SIR model. On the contrary,
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Fig. 7: The recognition rate r(f) for different fraction f in rumor spreading model. For
Facebook (a), Enron (b), rewired Facebook (c) and rewired Enron (d) social networks, we
display the recognition rate curves r(f) for k-shell kS , degree k, betweenness centrality
BC and PageRank. The fraction f ranges from 0.05 to 0.5. The infection rate βR in
rumor spreading simulations is 0.3 for all networks.
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in rumor spreading model, once a spreader encounters a spreader or stifler
neighbor, it will stop spreading the information. This dramatically restrains
the cascading behavior. It has been found that nodes with high k-shell values
serve as “firewalls” of rumor spreading [9], i.e., once these nodes are infected,
they will soon turn into stiflers. Under this situation, high k-shell nodes will
have lower chances to be infected due to their “firewall” neighbors. Since
the cascading behavior is restricted, it is sufficient to consider only one-step
neighbors. Therefore, degree outperforms k-shell in rumor spreading model.
5. Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we investigate individual’s susceptibility in spreading pro-
cesses. We first study the impact of community structure on people’s sus-
ceptibility. We find that, although the community structure can reduce the
infected population and slow down the spreading processes, it will not affect
nodes’ susceptibility significantly. For SIR model, we find the topological
indicator k-shell can better identify highly susceptible individuals, outper-
forming degree, betweenness centrality and PageRank. This can be explained
by the high correlation between nodes’ susceptibility and influence. On the
contrary, for rumor spreading model, nodes’ susceptibility and influence have
no clear correlation. Degree performs the best among considered topological
measures. We give an explanation of the different results of SIR and rumor
spreading models based on spreading mechanisms. In general, for spread-
ing processes that can trigger large-scale cascading behaviors, such as SIR
model, nodes in the core region should be more susceptible since they tend
to have highly susceptible neighbors, neighbors of neighbors, and so forth.
In contrast, in spreading models that rely on short-range diffusion, degree
should be a good choice of indicator for susceptibility. Our finding indicates
that, when identifying highly susceptible individuals, it is necessary to take
both topological features and spreading mechanisms into account.
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